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as solemnly consecrated to God and religion. A sentiment of reverence towards the graves of companions and ancestors would certainly go far towards impelling the courts in this country to hold
that a chuTchyard, used as a cemetery, is not subject to execution."
And in the case of Arbuckle v. Cowtar, 3 Bos. & Pul. 3.28, Lord
ALVANLEY said: "We have, therefore, complete authority for
saying that at common law, no process ever issued to a sheriff to
levy on ecclesiastical property the debt due in an action."
In the case of Brown v. Lutheran Murch, &'., 23 Penn. St. 495,
it was said: The sentiment is sound and has the sanction of mankind in all ages, which regards the resting-place of the dead as
hallowed ground, not subject to the laws of ordinary property, nor
liable to be devoted to common uses."
As was said by the vice-chancellor in Windt v. The German
Reformed Church,in speaking of the protection afforded the remains
of the dead when it became necessary to remove them, so may it
be confidently asserted of their last resting-places, namely, that their
protection depends not alone upon public laws of a restraining
character, but "in a still stronger public opinion."
WM. C. SCHLEY.
Baltimore, Md.

RECENT ENGLISH

DECISIONS.

High Court of Justice. Probate Division.
SOTTOMAYOR (OTHERWISE DE BARROS) v. DE BARROS (THE QUEEN'S
PROCTOR INTERVENING).
The validity of a marriage, as of any other contract, is to be determined, as a

general rule, by the lex loci contractus.
The dictum in &ottomrayor v. DeBarros, Law Rep. 3 Prob. Div. 5, that the question of personal capacity to enter into any contract, is to be decided by the law of
the domicile, dissented from.
A marriage took place in England, between a man domiciled there and a woman
domiciled in Portugal. By the laWs of Portugal, the marriage would have been
void for consanguinity. Held, that the marriage was governed by the law of England and was valid.
Marriage is founded upon contract but is something more. It is a status, the conditions of which are prescribed by each state for itself, and must be determined by
the law of such state.

THIs was a petition to declare a marriage void. It had been
twice previously before the courts, and the facts and the history of
the case are sufficiently set out in the opinion.
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Sir JAMES HANNEN, President.-In this suit the petitioner

prayed that her marriage with the respondent might be declared
null and void. The petition set forth that she and the respondent
were natives of Portugal, and at the time of the marriage domiciled
in Portugal; that they were natural and lawful first cousins; and
that according to the law of Portugal first cousins are incapable of
contracting marriage, on the ground of consanguinity. The respondent entered an appearance, but did not file an answer. The case
came on before Sir R. PHILLIMORE, who directed that the papers
should be sent to the Queen's proctor, in order that he might,
under the direction of the attorney-general, instruct counsel to
argue the question whether the petitioner had shown a sufficient
ground for a decree of nullity; first, by reason of the incapacity
of the parties to contract marriage in 1866; secondly, by reason
of fraud; and thirdly, by reason of the petitioner's want of intention to contract a marriage, and of her ignorance of the effect of
the ceremony. On the 7th November 1876, the Queen's proctor
obtained leave to intervene in the case and filed pleas. On 20th
January 1877, it was ordered by consent of the parties that the
questions of law referred to the Queen's proctor for argument be
heard before the questions of fact, without prejudice to either party.
The case, accordingly, came on for argument on 17th March 1877,
before Sir R. PHILLIMIORE, who stated that he was satisfied that
the petitioner perfectly understood she was about to contract a
marriage, and that it could not vitiate the marriage that she had
an erroneous view of its future consequences, and refused to set it
aside, on the ground of incapacity of age, or collusion, or fraud,
and further, held that the marriage, having been contracted in
England and being valid by English law, could not be declared
null, on the ground that the parties were incapacitated from entering into it by the law of Portugal: Law Rep. 2 Prob. Div. 81.
On appeal this judgment was reversed: Law Rep. 3 Prob. Div. 1.
The case was accordingly remitted to this division inorder that
the questions of fact raised by the Queen's proctor's pleas should be
determined. These pleas alleged: firstly, collusion; secondly, that
the petitioner and respondent were lawfully married; thirdly, that
said marriage was not procured by fraud; fourthly, that the petiitoner intended to, and did, contract a lawful marriage, and was not
ignorant of the effect thereof; fifthly, that the petitioner and
respondent cohabited as man and wife; sixthly, that the petitioner
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and respondent, at the time of the marriage, were domiciled in
England. It was objected on behalf of the petitioner that the
Queen's proctor was not entitled to intervene on any ground but
that of collusion.
This depends upon the construction to be put upon 23 & 24
Vict. c. 144, s. 17, by which it is enacted that during the period
between the decree nisi and the decree absolute, "any person shall
be at liberty * * * to show cause why the decree nisi should
not be made absolute by reason of the same having been obtained
by collusion, or by reason of material facts not brought before the
court." This part of the section does not apply, because no decree
ni8i has been pronounced; but the section proceeds, "and at any
time during the progress of the cause, or before the decree is made
absolute, any person may give information to the Queen's proctor
of any matter material to the due decision of the cause, who may
thereupon take such steps as the attorney-general may deem necessary; and if, from any information or otherwise, the Queen's
proctor shall suspect that any parties to the suit are, or have been
acting in collusion for the purpose of obtaining a decree contrary
to the justice of the case, he may, under the direction of the attorney-general, and by the leave of the court, intervene in the suit,
alleging such a case of collusion and retain counsel and subpoena
witnesses to prove it." In this case information was given to the
Queen's proctor of matter material to the due decision of the case,
among other things that facts tending to show that the parties at
the time of the marriage were not domiciled in Portugal, but in
England, which were not brought before the court, could be proved,
and he thereupon-took the directions of the attorney-general on the
subject, and, suspecting that the parties were acting in collusion,
he, under the direction of the attorney-general, and by leave of
the court intervened in the suit. He having so done, the question
is whether he may plead anything besides collusion. This question was decided in the affirmative by Lord PENZANCE, in the case
of Dering v. Dering, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 591.
There the intervention was after decree nisi; but in the case of
Drummond v. Drummond, 2 Sw. & Tr. 269, the same question had
arisen before the decree nisi, and Sir 0. CRESSWELL held that the
Queen's proctor was entitled to plead other pleas beside collusion,
and the same course was allowed in .Boardmanv. Boardman, Law
Rep. 1 P. & D. 233. I therefore hold that the Queen's proctor
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is entitled to set up other defences in addition to that of collusion,
and I proceed to give my findings on the several issues raised by
the Queen's proctor's pleadings. The first of these is whether
the petitioner and respondent are guilty of collusion. I am of
opinion that that charge is not established. The second is whether
the parties were lawfully married. It was not disputed that a cere.
mony of marriage was gone through which was valid according to
the law of England; whether it was valid according to the law of
Portugal, and the effect of its invalidity by that law, will be considered hereafter.
The third issue is whether the marriage was procured by fraud.
Fourthly, whether the petitioner intended to contract a lawful
marriage or was ignorant of any fact, the knowledge of which could
be material to the constitution of a valid marriage. On this subject
Imay refer to the evidence of Mr. Miller, a solicitor, who was consulted
by the father of the respondent with regard to the marriage before its
celebration, and who says that, being struck with the youth of the parties, he saw them on the subject, both separately and together, and that
he ascertained that they both wished it. That they were ignorant
of the effect of the Portuguese law on the ceremony is most probable; but this ignorance cannot affect the validity of the marriage.
The fifth issue is whether or not the petitioner and respondent cohabited as husband and wife. I do not give any opinion on this
subject, as I consider it unimportant for the purpose of this cause.
The sixth issue is the important one, on which the arguments have
chiefly turned, namely, whether or not the petitioner and respondent, or either of them, were or was at the time of the marriage
domiciled in England. With regard to the petitioner, as she was a
minor at the time of the marriage, her domicile was that of her father.
His domicile was Portuguese down to the time of his coming to
England in 1858, and I am not satisfied that be had at that time,
or at any time afterwards, mental capacity to change his domicile.
I therefore find. that the domicile of the petitioner at the time of the
marriage was Portuguese. With regard to the respondent, he also
was a minor, and his domicile was, therefore, the same as his father's.
This person formerly carried on the business of wine-grower and
exporter in Portugal. In 1858 he came to England, bringing with
him the whole of his family. Here he set up in business as a wine
merchant and importer. In 1860 he took a lease of a house in
.JDorset Square for twenty-one years. On 31st July 1861 an agree-
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ment was entered into for the formation of a partnership for twenty
years between the brother of Gonzalo De Barros and his sister and
sister-in law, as wine importers and merchants, under the style of
Caldos Brothers, of which partnership Gonzalo was to be manager
at a salary of 5001. per annumi with the option of becoming a partner. The business was to be and was carried on at 9 Catharine
court, St. Swithin's lane. The firm of Caldos Brothers failed in
1865; but Gonzalo De Barros continued to reside in London, and
his son, the respondent, being still a minor, set up in the wine business. It is said by one of the witnesses that Gonzalo De Barros
lived privately in London at the time, but it is probable that the
business of the son was regarded as the business of both. In 1868,
in the course of some legal proceedings, which were instituted in
Portugal, Gonzalo De Barros informed his solicitor that his domicile was English, and instructed him to collect evidence in support
of this assertion, which was done. In 1870, Gonzalo De Barros
died in London, never having quitted London since his coming
there in 1858. Evidence was given that he frequently said during
this period that he meant to remain in England; and on the other
hand, the only evidence besides that of the petitioner and her
mother, offered to rebut the inference to be drawn from the facts
above stated was that of one witness that he frequently said he
should return to Portugal "as soon as his affairs were settled." It
is evident, however, that this is not the language of a man who has
become the manager of a business at a salary of 5001. a year. And
even assuming the correctness of the witness's memory, such declarations cannot outweigh the evidence of the facts above stated:
Doucet v. Geoghegan, Law Rep. 9 Ch. Div. 441. From these
facts I draw the inference that the father of the respondent at the
time he became the manager of the wine business had adopted England
as his place of permanent residence, with the intention of remaining
there for an unlimited time-in other words, that he became domiciled here. It follows, therefore, that the respondent's domicile
was English also. There is abundant evidence that the respondent
himself, after he came of age, continued to look upon England as the
place of his domicile, and this may perhaps have some effect in considering what place his father had chosen as his domicile; but as the
time of the marriage is the important point in the case, I do not
think it necessary to dwell on the evidence of the respondent's subsequent intentions. The question then remains, what is the law
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ipplicable to such a case ? It is clear that the judgment which has
been already given by the Court of Appeal is not applicable to such'
a state of facts. The language of the Court of Appeal is explicit.
"It was pressed upon us in argument that a decision in favor of
the petitioner would lead to many difficulties if questions should
arise as to the validity of a marriage between an English subject
and a foreigner in consequence of prohibitions imposed by the law
of the domicile of the latter. Our opinion on this appeal is confined
to the case where both the contracting parties are at the time of
fheir marriage domiciled in a country, the law of which prohibits
their marriage."
This passage leaves me free to consider whether the marriage of a
domiciled Englishman in England with a woman, subject, by the
law of her domicile, to a personal incapacity not recognised by
English law, must be declared invalid by the tribunals of this
country? Before entering upon this inquiry, I would observe that
the Lords Justices appear to have laid down as a principle of law a
proposition which was much wider in its terms than was necessary
for the determination of the case before them. It is thus expressed:
"It is a well-recognised principle of law, that the question of personal incapacity to enter into any contract is to be decided by the
law of domicile." And again: "As in other contracts, so in that
of marriage, personal capacity must depend on the law of domicile."
It is of course competent for the Court of Appeal to lay down a
principle which, if it forms the basis of the judgment of that court,
must, unless it be disclaimed by the House of Lords, be binding on
all future cases. But I trust I may be permitted, without disrespect, to say that the principle thus laid down has not hitherto been
"well recognised." On the contrary, it appears to me to be a
novel principle for which, up to the present time, there has been no
English authority. What authority there is, seems to be distinctly
the other way. This is the case of.Ateade v. Roberts, 3 Exch. 183.
The contract on which defendant was sued was made in Scotland.
The defence was that the defendant was an infant; but Lord ELDON
held the defence bad, saying: "If the law of Scotland is that such
a contract as the present could not be enforced against an infant, it
should have been given in evidence. The law of the country where
the contract arose must govern the contract." Sir E. SIMPSON, in
the case of ,Scrimshire v. Serimskire, 2 Cons. 395, when dealing
with the subject, says: "These authorities fully show that all conVOL. XXVIII.- 1I
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tracts are to be considered according to the laws of the country
where they are made, and the practice of civilized countries has
been conformable to this doctrine, and by the common consent of
nations has been so received."
This is the view of the subject which is expressed by Burge,
vol. 1, § 4, 132, and by Story, Confl. of Laws, § 103; and Sir C.
CRESSWEILL, in ,Simonin v. Aallac, 2 Sw. & Tr. 67, says: "In con-

tracts the personal competency of individuals to contract has been
held to depend on the law of the place where the contract was
made."
If the English reports do not furnish more authority on the point,
it may, as Mr. Westlake has said, in his work on Private International Law, be referred to its not having been questioned. In
the American reports the authorities are numerous, and uniformly
support Sir C. CRESSWELL'S statement of the law which I have

quoted. I cannot but think, therefore, that the learned Lords
Justices would not desire to base their judgment on so wide a proposition as that which they have laid down with reference to the
personal capacity to enter into all contracts. In truth, very many
and serious difficulties arise if marriage be regarded only in the
light of a contract. It is indeed based upon the contract of the
parties, but it is a status arising out of contract to which each
country is entitled to attach its own conditions, both as to creation
and duration. In some countries no other condition is imposed
than that the parties, being of a certain age and not related within
certain specified degrees, sball have contracted with each other to
become man and wife; but that in those countries marriage is not
regarded merely as a contract, is clear, since the parties are not at
liberty to rescind it. In some countries, certain civil formalities
are prescribed; in others a religious sanction i required. If the
subject be regarded from this point of view, the effect of the recent
decision of the Court of Appeal has only been to define a further
condition imposed by English law, namely, that the parties do not
both belong by domicile to a country the laws of which prohibit
their marriage. But, as I have already pointed out, that judgment
expressly leaves altogether untouched the case of a marriage of a
British subject in England, where the marriage is lawful, with a
person domiciled in a country where the marriage is prohibited.
With regard to such a marriage, all the arguments which have hitherto been urged in support of the larger proposition, that a marriage
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good by the law of the country where solemnized, must be deemed
by the tribunals of that country to be valid, irrespective of the law
of the domicile of the parties, remain with undiminished effect.
They cannot be stated with greater accuracy and force than by Sir
C. ORESSWELL, in Sionin v. JTallac, 2 Sw. & Tr. 67, and as I
could not express myself so well, I shall adopt the language of
that learned judge as my own, without introducing the qualification which the decision of the Court of Appeal has created. The
Court of Appeal has distinguished the present case from that of
Simonin v. Hallac, on the ground that there the incapacity arose
from the want of consent of parents, and that "the consent of
parents required by the law of France must be considered a part
of the ceremony of marriage." Certainly Sir C. CRESSWELL did
not base his judgment on that ground. After observing that a
distinction might be drawn between an absolute and conditional
prohibition, he proceeds: "But taking the decree of the French
court in the suit there instituted as evidence that by the law of
France this marriage was void, we again come to the broad ques
tion, is it to be judged of here by the law of England or the law of
France ? In general, the personal competency or incompetency
of individuals to contract has been held to depend upon the law
of the place where the contract is made. But it was and is contended that such a rule does not extend to contracts of marriage,
and that parties are, with reference to them, bound by the law
of their domicile."
Then, after reviewing the authorities, he says: "It is very
remarkable that neither in the writings of jurists, nor in the arguments of counsel, nor in the judgments delivered in the courts of
justice, is any case quoted or suggestion offered to establish the
proposition that the tribunals of a country where a marriage has
been solemnized in conformity with the laws of that country should
hold it void because the parties to the contract were the domiciled
subjects of another country, where such a contract would not be
allowed."
And later on the following passage occurs, which is specially
applicable to this case:
"Every nation has a right to impose on its own subjects restrictions and prohibitions as to entering into marriage contracts, either
within or without its own territories; and if its subjects sustain
hardship in consequence of those restrictions, their own nation must
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bear the blame; but what right has one independent nation to cali
upon another nation equally independent to surrender its own laws
in order to give effect to such restrictions and prohibitions ? Iz
there be any such right it must be found in the law of nations,
that law 'to which all nations have consented, or to which they
must be presumed to consent, for the common benefit and advantage.' Which would be for the common benefit and advantage in
such cases as the present, the observance of the law of the country
where the marriage is celebrated, or of a foreign country ? Parties
contracting in any country are to be assumed to know, or to take
the responsibility of not knowing, the law of that country. Now, .
the law of France is equally stringent, whether both parties are
French or only one. Assume, then, that a French subject comes
to England, and there marries, without consent, a subject of another
foreign country, by the laws of which such a marriage would be
valid, which law is to prevail? to which country is an English
tribunal to pay the compliment of adopting its law ? As far as the
law of nations is concerned each must have an equal right to claim
respect for its laws. Both cannot be observed. Would it not then
be more ust, and therefore more for the interest of all, that the
law of that country should prevail which both are assumed to know
and to agree to be bound by? Again, assume, that one of the parties is English; would not an English subject have as strong a
claim to the benefit of English law as a foreigner to the benefit of
foreign law? But it may be said that in the case now before the
court both parties are French, and therefore no such difficulty could
arise. That is true; but if once the principle of surrendering our
own law to that of a foreign country is recognised, it must be followed with all its consequences; the cases put are, therefore, a fair
test as to the possibility of maintaining that by any comitas or ju.
gentium this court is bound to adopt the law of France as its
guide."
This was the opinion of Sir C. CRESSWELL, Baron CHANNELL and
Justice KEATING, constituting the full court which was at that time
in the position of the Court of Appeal, and its decisions were only
subject to review by the House of Lords. The Court of Appeal
has, indeed, without alluding to the arguments of these very eminent judges, now overruled their opinion; but Lord Justice COTTON
has expressed his concurrence in their views as far as is necessary
for the purpose of the present case. He says: "No country is
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bound to recognise the laws of a foreign state when they work
injustice to its own subjects, and this principle would prevent the
judgment in the present case being relied on as an authority for
setting aside a marriage between a foreigner and an English subject
domiciled in England on the ground of any personal incapacity not
recognised by the law of this country."
Numerous examples may be suggested of the injustice which
might be worked to our own subjects if a marriage was declared
invalid on the ground that it was forbidden by the law of the domicile of one of the parties. I select two. It is still the law in
some of the United States that a marriage between a white person
and a "person of color" is void. In some states the amount of
color which will incapacitate is undetermined. In North Carolina
all are prohibited who are descended from negro ancestors to the
fourth generation inclusive, though an ancestor of each generation
may have been a "white person." Suppose a woman domiciled in
North Carolina, with such an amount of color in her blood as would
arise from her great-grandmother being a negress, should marry in
this country, should we be bound to hold that such a marriage was
void? Or, suppose a priest or monk domiciled in a country where
the marriage of such a person is forbidden were to come to this
country and marry an English woman, could this court be called,
at the instance of the husband, to declare that the mairiage was
null, and to give a legal sanction to his repudiation of his wife?
Mr. Disey, in his excellent treatise on "Domicile," p. 223, answers
these questions in the negative, and places these two cases under this
head: "A marriage celebrated in England is not invalid on account
of any incapacity of either of the parties, which, though imposed
by the law of his or her domicile. is of a kind to which our courts
refuse recogniti6n." But on what principle are our courts to refuse
recognition if not on the basis of our own laws ? If this guide
alone be not taken, it will be open to every judge to indulge his own
feelings as to what prohibitions by foreign countries on the capacity
to contract a marriage are reasonable. What have we to do, or, to
be more correct, what have the English tribunals to do with what
may be thought in other countries on such a subject? Reasons
may exist elsewhere why colored people and white should not intermarry, or why first cousins should not intermarry, but what distinction can we properly draw between those cases ? Why are they
not both to be regarded in the same light here-namely, that as
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they are legally permitted by our laws, we cannot recognise theix
prohibition by the laws of other countries as a reason why we should
hold that such a marriage cannot be contracted here ? Of the
cases cited on the argument, the only one which I think it necessary to mention is that of Mette v. Mette, 1 Sw. & Tr., where
Sir C. CRESSWELL held that a domiciled English subject should not
marry his deceased wife's sister at the place of her domicile, although
by the law of that place the marriage would be good. But Sir C.
ORESSWELL had himself pointed out in Simonin v. Mallac the
difference between controversies arising in the country where the
marriage was celebrated and those arising elsewhere, and his judgment in that case showed that he considered that the law of the
place of the celebration was to prevail.
Before concluding I wish to direct attention to the statute law on
this subject of the marriage of first cousins. The statute of 32 of
Henry VIII., c. 88, after reciting that the See of Rome had
usurped the power of making that unlawful which by God's law
was lawful, and the dispensation whereof they always reserved to
themselves, as in kindred or affinity between cousins-german, and
all because they would get money by it and keep a reputation for
their usurped jurisdiction, enacts that every such marriage as
within the Church of England shall be contracted between lawful
persons, as by that act we declare all persons to be lawful that be
not prohibited by God's law to marry, shall be valid. This statute, and all the marriage acts which have since been enacted, are
general in their terms, and therefore appliable, and bind all people
within the kingdom. In the weighty language of Lord MANSFIELD, "the law and legislative government of every dominion
equally affects all persons and all property within the limits
thereof, and is the rule of decision for all questions which arise
there." Hale v. Campbell, Cowp. 208. Where is the enactment,
or what is the principle of English law which engrafts on this
statute the exception that it shall not apply to the marriage in
England of cousins-german, who, by the law of another country, are
prohibited from marrying without the dispensation of the Pope ?
And further, I would ask, what is the distinction between the
prohibition of a .marriage unless the consent of a parent be obtained, as in Simonin v. Mallae, and the prohibition of a marriage unless the dispensation of the Pope be granted, as in this
case? And if there be a distinction, which I am unable to per.
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ceive why is greater value to be attached by the tribunals of the
country to the permission of the Pope than to that of a father?
For the reasons I have given, I hold that the marriage between
the petitioner-and the respondent was valid, and I dismiss the petition.
The decision of the Court of Appeal
in this case (Law Rep. 3 Prob. Div. 1)
would appear to favor the validity of a
marriage between foreigners domiciled
in their native country, though the marriage be contracted in England, where
they were both temporarily resident;
the marriage being in accordance with
the law of their country, though inconsistent with the law in England or the
lex loci. At letst the case decided appears but the converse of the one- suggested, and indeed, as far as British subjects are concerned, such rule appears
to have been established in Ruding v.
Smith, 2 Hagg. Consis. Rep. 382, yet
not perhaps universally. Another important point underlies this judgment,
viz. ; one of the parties alone might retain the foreign domicile, though both
might be foreigners; or one of them
might be a Brifish subject, whether domiciled at hom or abroad. The former
event has been already adjudicated upon,
as we shall presently see. COTTON, L.
J., in the course of his judgment, remarked, "It was pressed upon us in
argument, that a decision in favor of
the petitioner would lead to many difficulties, it questions should arise as to
the validity of a marriage between an
English subject and a foreigner, in consequence of prohibitions imposed by the
law of domicile of the latter. Our opinion on this appeal is confined to the case
where both the contracting parties are,
at the time of their marriage, domiciled
in a country, the laws of which prohibit
their marriage. All persons are legally
bound to take notice of the laws of the
country where they are domiciled. No
country is bound to recognise the laws
of a foreign state when they work injus-

tice to its own subjects, and this principle would prevent the judgment in the
present case being relied on, as an authority for setting aside a marriage between a foreigner and an English subject, domiciled in England, on the
ground of any personal incapacity not
recognised by the law of this country."
"The law of a country where a marriage is solemnized must alone decide all
questions, relating to the validity of the
ceremony, by which the marriage is alleged to have been constituted ; but as
in other contracts so in that of marriage,
personal capacity must depend on the
law of domicile." And yet we shall
presently see that even the rule of "personal capacity or incapacity" has not
been always acted upon; Sussex Peerage Case, 11 CI. & F. 85. But further,
Mr. Burge on Foreign and Colonial Law
vol. 1, pp. 184, 185, says : The courts
of any country may decline to give to a
marriage the full effect which it would
have had, if conformable to their own
law, and yet decline to declare that 'the
parties have been living in concubinage.
Wharton, after expressing an opinion
that no American court would venture
to declare a marriage void, because the
formalities prescribed by the lex loci
were not followed, in the case of persons marrying in their domicile of origin,
with the intention of settling in the
United States, says: "A fortliori must
we repudiate the doctrine that the marriage abroad, of a domiciled citizen of
the United States is void, unless it were
solemnized with the formalities requisite
in the place of solenmization :" Wharton on Evidence, vol. 1, 83, 2 ed.,
to which is appended a note by the same
author, thus : "Whether the courts of the
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place of solemnization would hold valid
such a marriage, is a question I do not
propose to discuss in this place. It
should be observed, ho Never, that it by
no means follows, that because thejudex
loci contractus would hold the marriage
invalid, as to the subjects of his own
state, he would hold it invalid when the
parties are domiciled subjects of another
state, which recognises consensual marriages as valid. On this topic, the student is referred to several articles in the
Revue dn Droit International, in one of
which is given a ruling of the Tribunal
de la Seine, that such marriages would
not be held binding in France, when one
of the parties is a French subject, resting
the decision, therefore, on the duty due
by a subject to his sovereign. And see
Journal du Dr. Int. Priv. II. 182.
Compare Mr. Lawrence's valuable monogram on this subject, disputing in some
respects the conclusion above given, and
his Commentaries sur le Droit International de Wheaton, III., p. 357. See
Wharton's Confi. of Laws, sect. 173
et seq.
In the principal case both parties were
foreigners, and both were alleged when
the case was before the Court of Appeal,
to be domiciled in Portugal, though married in England. The impediment was
that of the consanguinity of first cousins,
not being within the prohibited degrees
of England, though forbidden in Portugal, except under a dispensation from
the Pope, not demandable as a matter of
right. Thus the parties may be said to
have been incapable, at the time, of contracting a marriage between themselves
in the country of their domicile. " Personal capacity," said COTTOz?, L. J.,
"must depend on the law of domicile."
Let us, for one moment, consider
what the law of domicile involves, the
very intricacy of which has led to a reopening and re-hearing of the Sottonmayor
Case, and which, as we shall presently
see, has resulted in further complica601nS.4

In Undy v. Undy, Law Rep. I Scotch
& Div. Appeal 441, the following pro.
positions were laid down:
Per Lord WEsTBuRY (Ex-Chancellor) : "To suppose that for a change of
domicile, there must be a-change of natural allegiance, is to confound the political and civil status, and to destroy the
distinction between patria and domnicihum."
Per the Lord Chancellor: "A man
may change his domicile as often as he
pleases, but not his allegiance. Exuere
patriam is beyond his power." Dictum
of Lord KHNGSDOWN, in Mfoorhouse v.
Lord, 10 H. of L. Cases 272, qualified.
Per Lord WEsTBuny again, "It is
a settled principle that no man shall be
without a domicile, and to secure this
end, the law attributes to every individual, as soon as he is born, the domicile
of his father if the child be legitimate:
and the domicile of the mother if the
child be illegitimate. This is called the
domicile of origin and is involuntary.
It is the creation of law, not of the
party. It may be extinguished by act
of law, as for example, by sentence of
death or exile for life, which puts an
end to the staius civilis of the criminal;
but it cannot be destroyed by the will
and act of the party. Domicile of choice
is the creation of the party. When a
domicile of choice is acquired, the domicile of origin is in abeyance, but is not
absolutely extinguished or obliterated.
When a domicile of choice is abandoned
the domicile of origin revives ; a special
intention to revert to it being unnecessary."
Per Lord CHEUaISFORD: " Stor says
that the moment a foreign domicile is
abandoned, ie native domicile is re-acquired. The word 're-acquired' is an
inaccurate expression. The meaning is,
that the abandonment of an acquired
domicile, ipsofacto, restores the domicile
of origin. If after having acquired a
domicile of choice, a man abandons it,
and travels in search of another domicile
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of choice, the domicile of origin comes
instantly into action and continues until
a second domicile of choice has been acquired."
Per Lord WESTURY: "A naturalborn Englishman may domicile himself
in Holland ; but if he breaks up his establishment there and quits Holland, declaring that he will not return, it is absurd to
suppose that his Dutch domicile clings to
him until he has set up his tabernacle
elsewhere."
Per Lord CAINs, in Bell v. Kennedy,
Law Rep. 3 H. L. 307: "With regard
to domicile of birth, the personal status
indicated by that term clings and adheres
to the subject of it until an actual change
is made by which the personal status of
another domicile is acquired."
Per Lord CURRTEHILL, in Donaldson
v. McClure, 20 D. 307 (cited Guthrie's
Savigny, p. 61) : "The animus to abandon one domicile for another imports an
intention not only to relinquish those particular rights, privileges and immunities
which the law and constitution of the
domicile confers, in the domestic relations,
in purchases and sales, and other business
transactions, in political or municipal
status, and in the daily affairs of common
life, but also the laws by which succession
to property is regulated qfter death. The
abandonment or change of domicile is,
therefore, a proceeding of a very serious
nature, and an intention to make such a
change requires to be proved by very satisfactory evidence."
Though, as we have seen it enunciated
in Undy v. Undy, a change of domicile
does not necessarily imply a change of
allegiance, there is at least one exception
to that proposition, viz., in the case of a
woman marrying a man owing a foreign
allegiance. In the ease of a woman, a
British subject, marrying a foreigner, she
not only acquires his domicile, but becomes, ipsofacto, naturalized in his counSee
try (7 & 8 Vict. c. 66, s. 16).
also Forsyth's Cases on Constitutional
Law p. 329.
VOL. XXVII.-12

Regard to the law of domicile, involves
an acquaintance with that law, and this
further involves an investigation of the

specific domicile of the contracting parties, or at least of one of them.
The domicile of origin may have been
superseded by an acquired one, more
than once, and the domicile of origin may
have been restored, ipsofacto, by the subsequent abandonment of the acquired one.
To ascertain the true domicile of a person
of roving habits, at the time of his marriage, might lead, and, as in the SbUomayor Case, has led to many perplexities.
The question is partly of nationality, and
partly of domicile, original or acquired.
The judgment on appeal, in Sottomayor v. De Barros, has, however, solemnly decided that the lex domicilii supersedes the lcx loci contractus, at least in
judging of personal capacity, and until
this case is overruled it must be accepted
as an authority. We proceed to consider
the converse of the proposition that a
marriage, illegal by the lex domicilii,
must be held illegal by the lex loci. It
is said this only relates to an absolute
personal incapacity, in the contracting
parties, amounting to a prohibition, but
where such personal incapacity might be
removed by a Papal dispensation it can
scarcely be deemed absolute. Indeed, in
Sinonin v. Afallac, 2 Sw. & Tr. 67, where
the incapacity might have been removed
by the consent of parents, or by not being
impeached within a given time, such incapacity was not considered an absolute
one. So, in the principal case, though
solemnized without the Papal dispensation, the marriage was but voidable, not
void, and could, according to the canon
law of Rome itself, only be impeached
during the lives of the parties to it.
We now come to consider the converse
of the above proposition, viz., whether,
and now far a marriage legal according
to the lex domicilii, the parties to it laboring under no personal incapacity, but
failing to comply with the ceremonial re
quirements of the lex loci, will be reco,
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nisd in the country of the lex loci conrractus. Let us take the case of a conjensual marriage per rerba de praseni,
perfectly legal if effected in the country
of the lex domidlii, but yet'contracted in
the country of the le lod where the celebration of such marriages cannot be enforced by any court. Take, for instance,
England, bearing in mind the words of
CorTON, L. J., in ,ouomayor v. De Barros, that "the law of a country, where a
marriage is solemnized, must alone decide
all questions relating to the validity of the
ceremony by which the marriage is alleged
to have been constituted, but, as in other
contracts, so in that of marriage, personal capacity must depend on the law
of domicile; and if the laws of any country prohibit its asujects, &c., 'from
contracting marriage,' &c., this, in our
opinion, imposes on the subjects of that
country a personal incapacity, which continues to affect them so long as they are
domiciled in the country where this law
prevails, and renders invalid a marriage
between persons both at the time of their
marriage, subjects of and domiciled in the
country which imposes this restriction,
wherever such marriage may have been
solemnized." Why then should not these
same two ingredients, nationality and
domicile, be considered as essential ingredients in judging of the validity of a marriage according to the lex domicilii,
though not celebrated according to the
ceremonial required by the lex loci I
As was said by Lord BnouonuA, in
WaTender v. Warrender, 2 Cl. & F.
488, "the question always must be, did
the parties intend to contract marriage V"
It is true, his lordship proceeds to add,
" the laws of each nation lay down the
forms and solemnities, a compliance with
which shall be deemed the only criterion
of the intention to enter into the contract." This is in accord with the opinion of the Court of Appeal in Sottomayor
v. De Barros, and, granting this to be
the prevailing doctrine, the question still
remains whether a form of marriage

never expressly forbidden or extin
guished, even by the English Marriage
Act, and still recognised in many parts
of Christendom, as based upon the universal common law of Europe from the
earliest ages of Christianity, can fall of
recognition by the le= led, for want of
the mode of celebration enjoined by its
municipal law, although perfectly legal
if contracted in the country of the lex
domidi ii.
It should be remembered that the cere
mony required by any municipal law is
but evidence of the intent, and as far as
relates to the subjects of the state enacting such requirements may be the only
evidence allowed of such intent. The
object is, to use the words of Lord
BROUOAM in the case just cited, "the
ascertaining the validity of the contract,
and the meaning of the parties, that is
the existence of the contract and its construction." The contract, for want of
compliance with certain forms, may be
deficient in incidents in the locus contractus, as, for instance, dower; and especially, dower ad ostiuia ecclesiz may not,
and indeed never could attach to any
marriage not solemnized infacie ecclesus.
It would be a contradiction in terms if it
could. But yet the marriage might be
valid and the children legitimate: Bracton (A. D. 1235). From the time of
Bracton to Lord STOWELL, the latter of

whom lived and acted judicially long after
the passage of the Marriage Act, numerous authorities evidence that consensual
marriages were deemed valid, although
certain incidents might not attach to them,
and the neglect of the religious ceremony
may have rendered the parties liable to
ecclesiastical censure : 4 Brac., De actions
Doris302 b; Viner's Abr., tit. Marriage,
F. ; Co. Litt. 34 a; Reeve's History of
the Common Law, under the head of
"Espousals;" Blackst. Com., c. 15, p.
432.
Speaking of the laws of each nation annexing certain disqualifications or impos.ing certain conditions precedent on certair
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In the principal case, the Court of
Appeal has decided that there was no
valid contract entered into the country
of the lex loci, because such a marriage
was prohibited by the lex domicilii of the
parties, and this although the laws of the
locus contractus were strictly complied
with. Afortiori should a marriage contract be deemed valid if sanctioned by the
lex domicilii, and not prohibited by the
lex loci, though celebrated without the required forms or conditions precedent, but
for want of which certain incidents may
not attach to such a marriage to the t-ll
extent of the enjoyment of the rights of
dower, courtesy, or the like, in the country of the lex loci contractus.
Premising that the Canon law or common law relating to marriage once prevailed in England, as it does still in
many parts of the United States of America, and that, as Lord HOLT says, in
WIgnore's Case, 2 Salk. 438, "By the
Canon law, a contract per rerba de prcesenti, is a marriage, as I take you to be
my wife ;" and that "nothing can be
more improbable than the existence of
one law for all Christian Europe, and
another for England" (Lord BROVGHAM,
in The Queen v. Millis, infra) ; or, to put
the case even stronger, in the language
of Lord CAMPBELL, in the same case,
"There is not a trace in any ecclesiastical writer of the law of marriage in
England being different from the law of
marriage in other Christian countries ;"
referring, in addition, to the high authority of Lord STOWELL, who says, in his
remarks in Lindo v. Belisario, I Hagg.
Cons. Rep. 229, marriage "is a contract
according to the law of nature, antecedent to any civil institution, and which
may take place to all intents and purposes, whenever two persons of different
the latter, to use Lord BROUGHA 's own sexes engage, by mutual consent, to live
words, "must be dealt with by the courts together. * * * In most countries it is
of the country where the parties reside also clothed with religious rites, even in
and where the contract is to be carried rude societies. Yet, in many of these
into execution :" Marrenderv. Marren- societies, they maybe irregular, informal,
and discountenanced, yet not invah
der, supra.
prtLies, Lord BROUGHAM, in Warrender

v. lMarrender, supra, says, "this falls
exactly within the same rule;" but he
adds, "the English jurisprudence, while
it adopts the principle in words, would
not, perhaps, in certain cases which may
oe put, be found very willing to act upon
it throughout. Thus, we should expect
that the Spanish and Portuguese courts
would hold e English marriage avoidable between uncle and niece, or brother
and sister-in-law, though solemnized under Papal dispensation, because it would
clearly be avoidable in this country.
But I strongly incline to think that our
courts would refuse to sanction a marriage
between those relatives, contracted in
the Peninsula, under dispensation, although beyond all doubt such a marriage
would there be valid by the lex loci contractus, and incapable of being set aside
by any proceedings in that country."
Why, it may be asked, should a foreign
nation be expected to respect the law of
England without requiring a corresponding respect to their law on the part of
England ? Upon what international
ground has England a right to expect
that, in the first case put by Lord
BROUGHAM, her lex loci would be respected by the foreign nation, and in the
second case that her ler domicilii should
prevail against the foreign lex loci, without some reciprocal concession on the
part of England? His lordship seems
to be fully alive to the inconsistency;
yet the &ttomayor Case confirms his view
of the English jurisprudence. We must
not, however, confound incidents with
esscnce. The essence of the contract is
the intention. The incidents are "the
rights under it, flowing from and arising
out of it, parcel of the contract." The
former is to be judged of by the lex loci,
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dated ;" it may well be asked does the
canon law, which, according to Lord
STOWELL, bound the former ecclesiastical courts, also bind the present court for
matrimonial causes ? That it does to
some extent, there is no doubt (20 & 21
Vict. c. 85, s. 22) ; but what is the effect
of it, and to what extent do its principles
operate? The solution of these questions
involves subjects of vast social importance.
In The Queen v. Millis, 10 Cl. & Fin.
941, decided. by the House of Lords,
March 1844, Lord Chief Justice TiwDAL, in delivering the opinion of the
judges to the lords, said, speaking of
consensual marriages or marriages per
verba de prsenti, "The only clause in
Lord HAwDwicKE's Act that affects these
contracts is the 13th, which enacts only
that no suit or proceeding shall be had
in any ecclesiastical court in order to
compel celebration. These contracts,
therefore, are still lawful, though they
cannot be enforced in any ecclesiastical
court."
Mr. Jacob, also a great authority, in
his 2d edition of "Roper on Husband
and Wife," says, the Marriage Act
"does not nullify contracts de przsenti,
or declare that they shall not be deemed
marriages." The question before the
house was, whether such a marriage was
sufficient to support an indictment for
bigamy in Ireland, and this being a crimianl case the decision rested upon the
well-known rule of " semper presumitur pro negante."
Before Lord HlAenwicun's Act, 26
Geo. II., c. 33, unquestionably such contracts were deemed verum matrimonium,
as was admitted by Lords BRouGHAMt,
CAMPBELL,

DENMAN,

LYNDHURST,

and ABINGERo. Indeed the
house was equally divided in opinion as
to whether such a marriage was not sufficient to support the indictment in question. Since then, however, viz., on 9th
August 1844, the 7 & 8Vict. c. 81, s. 49,
was passed, enacting, or rather directing,
that the rules prescribed by the rubrics
COTTENHAM

shall continue to be observed by every
person in holy orders of the United
Church of England and Ireland who shall
solemnize any marriage in Ireland, &e.
This was deemed necessary because
Lord HAnDWbOKE's Act did not extend
to Ireland, although a clause similar and
in fact identical to the 13th in the English Act was imported into the Irish Act,
58 Geo. III., c. 81 (A. D. 1818), but
yet there was, up to that time, no statute
in Ireland requiring marriages to be solemnized in a church, neither were banns
or license requisite. In point of fact,
although the evidence of marriage de
facto per verba de prsenti is no longer
receivable in courts of justice, whether
in England or Ireland, where such marriages have taken place in either of those
countries, at least between British subjects, yet whatever recognition they received prior to 7 & 8 Vict. c. 81, they
still retain, no nullifying clause having
ever been inserted in any statute relating
to Ireland. But the question we now desire to raise is whether such a contract
entered into in England between, for instance, a domiciled citizen of the United
States and an English subject (the latter
being the woman), confers upon the
female the domicile of an American citizen. If the contract be that of marriage
it undoubtedly does : Dig. 50, I. 37 ;
Code xii. I. 13; X.; 40, 9. But then
does this doctrine apply to marriages de
facto as well as to marriages de juret
If marriages per Verba de prmsenti be still
accounted marriages, even in England,
though they cannot be enforced in any
ecclesiastical court, and cannot be evi.
denced in a court of justice, do they,
nevertheless, in the case of the husband
being a foreigner, confer his domicile
upon his wife ? In other words, does
such a contract evidence the intention of
the parties to contract an alliance in accordance with the law of the man's foreign domicile where such a marriage is
not only recognised, but evidenced by
the words de prwzsenti.
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Where there is an absolute prohibition
not removable in the country of the domicile of origin, the lex domicilii creating
the incapacity might well be allowed to
prevail even in a foreign country. In
the Sussex PeerageCase, 11 C. & F. 85,
the evidence given by Dr., afterwards
Cardinal Wiseman, before the House of
Lords, was to the effect that a marriage
at Rome of British subjects, rendered
incapable by British law of contracting
marriage between themselves, anywhere,
without a certain consent, or upon the
refusal of such consent, without adopting
further proceedings, as directed by the
English Royal Marriage Act (12 Geo.
III., c. 11), was nevertheless valid at
Rome itself, though not celebrated in accordance with the decree of the Council
of Trent, the parties being Protestants,
and therefore not amenable to the decrees of that Council, and the English
Marriage Act or the special law of their
domicile under that act having no force
or effect in Rome. This, however, was
scarcely an absolute prohibition, and as
in the case of Simon in v. Mallac, resulted
in the unseemly conflict of a marriage,
valid in the country of the lex loci, beiig
held invalid in the country of domicile.
Lord CAMPBELL'S view of the Roman
Catholic doctrine is thus corroborated by
the Sussex Peerage Case. Such in fact
is based upon the universal common law
of Christendom. If, however, the validity or invalidity of the marriage in a
foreign country, is to depend upon the
lex domiciliiof the parties, as decided by
.he English Court of Appeal in Stomayor v. DeBarros, even in a case where
an impediment is removable under certain circumstances, and that therefore a
marriage, invalid according to the lex
domicilii of a foreign country, where the
parties to the contract are still domiciled,
is to be held invalid in the country of the
lex loci contractis, would the converse
!ild good, viz., would a marriage valid
in the country of domicile, be held valid
in the country of the lex loci, although

the ceremonial requirements of the lex
loci contractus had not been complied
with? In other words, would a marriage of two foreigners, still retaining
their domicile of origin in a country
where a perfect and valid marriage may
be contracted per versa de prasenti alone,
be deemed valid, if so contracted in a
country where such a marriage is not
recognised de jure, although it may not
have been absolutely destroyed de facto ?
Then follows the further question,
Whether, both parties being foreigners,
but only one of them retaining his foreign domicile, such a marriage so
contracted, can be recognised by the
country of the lex loci? And further,
whether only one of the parties, the man,
being a foreigner and having a foreign
domicile, the lex domicilii can thus be imported into the country of the lex loci,
upon the acknowledged principle of the
husband conferring his domicile upon the
wife ? If the country of the lex loci repudiates the modus contractusof the foreign domicile,- is it still within the j
geutium for the country of the foreign
domicile to give effect to the marriage
notwithstanding ? The comity of nations
would seem to imply a mutual recognition or mutual repudiation and not a perpetual conflict of laws. Referring to the
case of The Queen v. Millis, 10 Cl. &
F. 875, Mr. Tyler, in his work on the
Law of Coverture, under the head of Institution of Marriage, says, "The ques
tion was not definitirely settled whethei
a marriage per verha de przsfnti 'by
words of the present time,' in the presence of witnesses only, is a valid marriage under the English laws :" p. 816.
Such at all events appears to be
the American law. The authority just
cited, Mr. Tyler, says, in sect. 652 of
the above-named work: "In most of
the states, the marriage is held to be
valid and binding, notwithstanding it is
entered into with no rites or ceremonies :
Clarkv. Clark, 10 N. H. 383. And a
valid marriage may exist without any
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formal solemnization: Clayton v. Wardell, 4 N. Y. 230." And we might add
to this, a decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States, April 29th 1878,
that the statutes of any state providing for
the presence of a minister or magistrate
at the solemnization of marriage, do not
render a marriage at common law invalid
for non-conformity, unless there are express words of nullity in the statute.
This case was that of an Indian girl by
declaration and cohabitation with a
citizen of the United States. See Meister v. Moore. 6 Otto 76. Statutes
must contain express words of nullity,
otherwise they are treated as directory
only. "The courts hold," says Mr. Tyler, again, "1that such statutes are intended to be directory only upon ministers and magistrates, and to prevent as
far as possible, by penalties upon them,
the solemnization of marriages, when
the prescribed conditions and formalities
have not been fulfilled : Parton v. Hervey, 1 Gray 119. In the language of
PAnsoxs, C. J.," When a justice or minister shall solemnize a marriage between
parties who may lawfully marry, although without the consent of the parents
or guardians, such marriage would undoubtedly be lawful, although the officer
would incur the penalty for a breach of

Hantz v. Sealey, 6 Binn. 405: Tke
King v. Birmingham, 8 B. & Cr. 29;
Cattrell v. Sweatman, I Rob. 304; Id.
sect. 652.
The point for which we are contending
is that even though a marriage may not be
a marriage de jure it siay, nevertheless,
be one defitcto: the legal inci.lents, such
as dower, &c., may not attach in the locus
contractus to such a marriage, for want
of compliance with the lex loci,
but can
it be said to be absolutely void ? Although in Catherwood v. Caslon, 13 M.
& W. 264, where the parties, both being
English and members of the Church of
England, were married in Syria, not according to the lex loci
(Syria being a Mahommedan country), but according to
the rites of the Church of England and
at the British consulate at Beyrout by an
American Methodist minister, the marriage was held not sufficiently proved,
this was because the ler domicilii
was not
complied with, a iMethodist minister not
being a person in Holy Orders according
to the English view, as required by the
le domicilii, such designation pertaining
only to the clergy of the Church of England or to Roman Catholic priests :
Scrimshire v. Scrmshire, 2 Hag. R. 395.
PAnxE, B., however, in this very case
said, '"It may be proper to advert to a
duty:" Milford v. lMorcester, 7 -Mass. dictum in Buller's Nisi Pris
28, that a
48, 54, 55. In Maine, North Carolina marriage according to any form of reliand Tennessee, a contrary doctrine has gion is a marriage defacto; and for
this
been held, and Mr. Tyler adds: "The
the case of Woolsion v. Scott, before
weight of authority is in favor of the DENmcsow, J., in 1753, is quoted."
rule, that in the absence of any provi- This case of Catherwood v. Cas!on, howsion of law declaring marriages not cele- ever, was neither in accordance with
the
brated in a prescribed manner, or be- le loci nor the lex doincilii. It is contween parties of certain ages, absolutely ceded that the civil consequences or
void, all marriages regularly made ac- incidents may not attach in England to
cording to the common law, are valid a mere marriage de facto at the present
and binding, although had in violation day, but the contention is that as beof the specific regulations imposed by tween persons domiciled in a country
statute. This is the general doctrine of where de presenti marriages are still
the courts, both in this country and in recognised the contract, though entered
England :" Parton v. Hervey, I Gray into abroad, to be fulfilled at home, is a
119 ; ifilford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48 ; valid contract and de facto marriage.
Londonderry v. Cheste-, 2 N. H. 268;
Referring to Lord Bnouoist's
00-
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servations in Wrarrender v. Warrender, be very precise and definite to destroy,
in the House )f Lords, he puts a cse even locally, such a natural law, and ro
of the lex domicilii prevailing over the legislation in England has ventured to
lex loci contractus, and that too, where do more than enact that no suit shall be
there was no absolute prohibitiou by the instituted in any ecclesiastical court to
lex loci contraclus, the impediment hav- compel celebration of such a marriage,
ing been already removed by a Papal dis- and even Lord HAnDWVICK'8 Marriage
pensation, and thus the lex loci satisfied. Act has since been much modified hy the
In England, such a marriage, viz., one 4 Geo. IV., c. 76: "By the law of Engwithin the prohibited degrees, would be land, as it existed at the time of the passabsolutely void under a special statute ing of the Marriage Act, a contract of
nullifying it in so many words. But marriage per verba de prcesentiwas a conwith regard to a marriage per verba de tract indissoluble between the parties
prcscnti, not absolutely prohibited, there themselves, affording to either of the conis no ground of avoidance. It is based senting parties, by application to the
upon more than the canon law itself. It Spiritual Court, the power of compelling
is simply irregular and deficient in the the solemnization of an actual marriage."
incidentz which are creatures of the mu- Such was the unanimous opinion of the
nicipal law. Bracton (temp. Henry III., judges, as expressed by Ts D.tr, C.
J.,
A. D. 1235), Book 4, De actione Dotis, in the case of The Queen v. ,Iljlh, in the
302 b, draws a distinction between a le- House of Lords. This power to compel
gitimate and clandestine marriage. The a solemnization in facie ecclesite was demarriage in facie ecclesim conferred the stroyed by the clause in the Marriage Act
right of dower ad ostium ecclesice, but a before mentioned, but that clause did not
marriage per rerbade prosenti was suffi- declare that such a contract should not be
cient for the succession to propertyby the deemed a marriage. In Wigrmore's Case,
issue. "Dower ad ostium ecclesimc," says 2 Salk. 438, Lord HOLT said, in speakD'Anvers, the translator of Rolle's ing of marriages per verba de prmssenti,
Abridgment," is better for the wife than says, "By the law of nature such con
dower at common law." D'Anvers's tract is binding and sufficient; for though
Rolle's Abr. 665. The reason given is that the positive law of man ordainq that mardower ad ostium ecclesice being declared riages shall he made by a priest, that law
and the quantity openly set out at the only makes this marriage irregular, and
entrance of the church itself, with the not expres-ly void ; but marriages ought
priest as a witness, required no other as- to be solemnized according to the rites
assignment: I. Inst. 34; Lit. sect. 39.
of the Church of England to entitle them
Dower, at common law, would attach to the privileges attending legal marto a common-law marriage, and dower riage, as dower, thirds," &c.
ad ostiua eccle.ice to a marriage in facie
The great difference, or rather distincecclesioe, the latter, however, taking the tion, that always was recognised by tle
precedence where the common-law mar- common law was that whilst the 3.huqstriage remained unsolemnizCd in facie ence of a regular marriage in facie ececdesice.
cfe.i4a rendered a subsequeht marriage
The natural law maybe said to be the void, that of an irregular marriage or one
prevailing law of Christendom in the ab- per verba de prmrenti only rendered it
sence of any local legislation to the con- voidable. The temporal courts took no
trary. Indeed, it may he said to be the notice of a marriage per verba de present.
prevailing law of the world in the absence Thus if A. married B.
by verbal contract,
of such municipal legislation. Such local and afterwards married C. in face of the
and municipal legislation must therefore church, they held the second marriage
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good. But if B. compelled A. to celebrate. the first marriage in fade ecclesice,
the temporal courts would immediately
adLpt the first marriage, which they had
previously repudiated, and reject the
second marriage, which they had previously recognised. It was to remedy
this apparent incongruity that the clause
to which we have adverted was inserted
in the Marriage Act. Up to the passing
of this act the consent of the contracting
parties was deemed everything to constitute a binding union, the solemnities of
religion being merely adjuncts, proper to
be observed, but not indispensable. The
temporal courts paid a deference to the
requirements of the spiritual courts in

it can only be in right of the husband.
the law of whose domicile must determine, not so much the validity of the
marriage, as his right to contract it with
or without certain solemnities or ceremonies.
In the case of Procter V. Procter,2
Hagg. Cons. Rep. 292-301, Lord STOWELL said, "It is notorious that this
country, at the Reformation, adopted almost the whole of the law of matrimony,
together with all its doctrines of the indissolubility of contracts per verba de
prosenti et per verba defuturo, of separation a inensa et thoro, and many others;
the whole of the matrimonial law is, in
matter and form, constructed upon it."
this respect.
In the Roman Catholic Church, notwithIn The Qzceen v. Millis, Lord CAMP- standing some decrees of the Fourth
BELL said, as has been before mentioned,
Council of the Lateran (tern. rope Inno"According to the doctrine of the Roman cent III.), for the regulation of marCatholic Church no religious ceremony riages, a clandestine union only subjected
was or is necessary to the constitution of
the rebellious couple to the terrors of eca valid marriage. Although marriage is clesiastical censure, and in the case of a
considered a sacrament, this sacrament, consensual marriage they could, under
like baptism, might be administered under pain of excommunication, be compelled
certain circumstances without the inter- to proceed to a public celebration of the
vention of a priest," &c. Now if this be nuptials. The subsequent decree of the
the doctrine of the oldest of Christian Council of Trent, requiring the presence
churches, which once dictated the uni- of a priest at the nuptials, is not imper
versal law of Christendom in such mat- ative upon any country (even Catholic)
ters. and if, as Lord CA31PBELL adds, that declines to adopt it, and without
"there is not a trace in any ecclesiastical such adoption such a clandestine or irregwriter of the law of marriage in England ular marriage would be deemed valid.
being different from the law of marriage Such a marriage was in fact complete in
in other Christian countries," we can un- substance, but deficient in ceremony:
derstand why the English legislature has Poynter on Marriage and Divorce 15.
hesitated to declare marriages per verba It is unnecessary to add that the decrees
de prmsenti to be invalid, but has simply of the Council of Trent were never re-leclared them incapable of compulsory ceived in England. The principles of
celebration by any ecclesiastical or, as the common law, based upon the canon
now substituted, matrimonial court. The law of Christendom, are few and simple.
domicile of the husband might, neverthe- In fact, until the time of Pope Innocent
less, be acquired by the wife although the III., who died in 1216, there never had
celebration of the marriage itself could been any religious solemnization of marnot be enforced by any ecclesiastical court. riage. "The solemnization of marriage
The Marriage Act does not say that the was not used in the church before an ortemporal courts shall not give effect to dinance of Innocent III., before which
the acquired domicile. If, then, the ac- the man came to the house where the
quired foreign domicile be acknowledged woman inhabited and carried her with
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him to his house, and this was all the ceremony:" Viner's Abr., tit. Marriage,F.
See also Canjolle v. Ferrie, 26 Barb.
117, 184, 185; s. c. 23N. Y. 90.
For a final definition of a contract or
esposals per rerba de prmsenti, Lord
LYNDHURST, in Regina v. Millis, 10 Cl.
& Fin. 534, pronounced the following:
"A contract of espousals de preasenti was
indissoluble; the parties could not by
mutual consent release each other from
the obligation. Either party might by a
suit in the ecclesiastical courts, compel
the other to recognise the marriage infacie
ecclesi.
The contract was considered to
be of the essence of matrimony, and was
therefore, and by reason of its indissolude nature, styled in the ecclesiastical
law verurnmatrimonium. If either party
afterwards married with another person,
solemnizing the same in facie ecclesie,
such marriage might be set aside, even
after cohabitation and the birth of children, and the parties compelled to celebrate the first marriage in facie eccie-

of the parties, or one of them, and that one
being the man, must determine the validity of the marriage, where the law of the
country of the domicile differs from the
law of the locus contractus, and that not
only where the difference consists of an
absolute prohibition, but even of a removable impediment; and thus the converse of the proposition that a marriage
invalid in the country of the domicile is
likewise invalid in the locus contractu.
even though celebrated there with all
legal solemnities, would appear to hold
good, viz., that a marriage valid according to the law of the country of domicile
is valid when celebrated in the locus contractus, though otherwise not recognisable
by the lex loci contractus. If this be so,
a fortiori a form of marriage, once of
universal acknowledgment, though no
longer recognised, yet, never formally
destroyed, in one country, must be acknowledged, if such be still the lex domicilii, though contracted in the country
of the lex loci. It might be added that
though the English statute forbids any
Now the 13th clause in Lord HARD- suit to be
instituted to compel celebration
wxcKE's Act merely enacts, that for the in faie ecclesice
of a contract per verba
future no suit shall be brought in any de prmesenti, there is
no statute which
ecclesiastical court to compel celebration.
takes away the power to submit to such
The marriage de facto, the contract, celebration. If another
marriage had
"the essence of matrimony," to use Lord intervened between the contract
and its
LYNDHURST's words, remained intact. celebration it might still, perhaps, be
Now the rights under this contract and asked, which is really the prior marriage ?
"all its incidents, and the rights of the Is the first marriage, havingsubsequently
parties to it, and the wrongs committed been solemnized,
to date from the original
by them respecting it, must be dealt with contract per
verba de prcesenti ? The
by the courts of the country where the Queen
v. Millis, can scarcely be said to
parties reside and where the contract is
have decided these points.
to be carried into execution." Lord
The case of The Queen v. Millis,
BROUGHAM, in Warrender v. Warrender,
merely decided that a marriage perverba
2 Cl. & Fin. 488. His lordship is evi- de prwsenti, without the intervention
of a
dently referring to the lex domicilii of person in Holy Orders, was not such a
the parties.
marriage as would support an indictment
If the judgment of the Court of Appeal for bigamy. The same may be said,
we
in Souomayor v. De Barros be correct, believe, of a marriage in
that part of the
and should it be confirmed by any further United States where marriages by repute
appeal from the decision of Sir JAmEs and celebration are recognised.
An
HANeE-munder the modified state of facts,
actual formal marriage must in such case
as found by him, supra, then the domicile be proved, not a mere inferential one:
VoL. XXVIII.- 13
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Pattersonv. Gaines, 6 How. U. S. 550. adopted. If such be
so in annulling a
It was even alleged in Queen v. Millis,
marriage, upon the ground that it is forthat a marriage per verba de prmsenti was
bidden by the lex domiclii, does the connot proved, as, according to that case, to
verse hold good, that the lex domicilii
constitute such a marriage in England or should prevail in afflrming
a marriage
Ireland, the presence of a person in Holy not celebrated in accordance
with the lex
Orders had always been deemed neces- loci contractus? We
think it is even
sary. But this was admitted to be a re- an a fortiori
case, the man's domicile
quirement under some local Saxon cangoverning the case, the wife invariably
ons, of King Edmund (A. D. 940).
taking the domicile of the husband.
How any Saxon canons enacted one
Many of the difficulties which have
hundred and twenty-six years before arisen, in construing
a contract of marthe Norman Conquest of England,
riage may, perhaps, be traceable to a discould affect Ireland, then not under
regard of the two-fold character of this inthe dominion of England, remained
stitution. Marriage is not merely a conunexplained in the judgment. Such
tract, but a status likewise. Sir JAxES
local canons, however, could have no
lAN rsays in delivering his opinion,
effect upon the general law of Chris- supra:
"In truth, very many and
tendom. Such Saxon canons were truly serious difficulties arise
if marriage be
only the king's ecclesiastical law, binding -regarded
only in the light of a conon his subjects alone. See observations tract.
It is, indeed, based upon the
of Lord LYNDHURST, Chancellor, In re contract
of the parties, hut it is a status
Millis, also of Chief Justice TNDAL, in
arising out of a contract to which each
same case.
country is entitled to attach its own conThe sole question now before us is, Is
ditions, both as to creation and duthe law of domicile to take precedence
ration."
In the case we have been
of the law of the place of contract? If
submitting the contract may well have
so, and the presence of a priest not being taken
place in one country, where at all
required by the lex domicilfi, nor yet by
events such a contract is not prohibited,
the ancient canon or common law cadet
and the status arising out of such conqumetio of the English local requirement tract, wiith
all its incidents, be subjected
in that respect. We have seen that the
to the conditions which each country may
lex domicilli is preferred not only in the
respectively attach thereto, even to the
case of an absolute prohibition domicilif, extent of withholding
recognition by the
out even in a qualified one, at least such locus contractus
through a neglect of its
must be assumed unless the decision
ceremonial requirements, and yet the
of the Court of Appeal in &ttomayor v. marriage, qua
marriage, may not be inDe Barros, should be overruled, and valid.
HUG31 WEIGHTMAN.
the views indicated in the foregoing
New York.
opinion of Sir JAxEs HA-scE be finally
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DREW v. NUNN.
The lunacy of a principal, if so great as to render him incapable of contracting for
himself, puts an end to an authority to contract for him, previously given to his agent.
Where a principal holds out an agent as having authority to contract for him, and
afterwards becomes lunatic, he is liable on contracts made by the agent after
the
lunacy, with a person to whom the authority has been so held out, and who had
no
notice of the lunacy.

DREW b WUL'7.

TIE claim was for asum of 99.. s4..4d., the price of boots and
shoes supplied by the Iplaintiff to the defendant on the order of
dealt~with
he d&endant, at different tis,
the defendant's wife.
by check
paid
defendant
1872,
August
In
the plaintiff on credit.
wife's
his
on
supplied
goods
for
a bill then owing to the -plaintiff
of
state
weak
a
in
being
defendant
order. In November 1873, the
of
whole
the
health, authorized the agent of his property to pay
ani
the defendant's income to his wife, and he also authorized
allowed her to draw checks at discretion.
In December 1873, the defendant became lunatic, and was placed
in a private asylum, where he remained until April 1877. Between
April 3d 1876, and June 27th 1877, the defendant's wife ordered
the goods from the plaintiff, the price of which was claimed in this
action, and the plaintiff supplied the goods to her on credit. The
plaintiff was ignorant when the goods were so supplied that the
defendant had become lunatic, or that he had given his wife
authority to receive his income. The defendant recovered his
reason, and the plaintiff brought this action.
In June 1877, the defendant revoked the authority he had given
to his wife to draw checks, and he had before that time prohibited
his agent from paying any income to her.
On these facts MELLOR, J., refused to leave to the jury the
question whether or not, when the goods were supplied, the income
received by the wife was sufficient for the maintenance of herself
and her family, and directed the jury to find for the plaintiff for the
amount claimed.
The Court of Appeal, on the application of counsel for the
defendant, made an order nisi for a new trial on the ground of
misdirection.
Willis, Q. C., now showed cause.-The judge was right in
directing the verdict for the plaintiff on the facts. The first question is, was the authority given to Mrs. Nunn to pledge her
husband's credit determined by his subsequent lunacy ? It is submitted that it was not. Here there was an express authority given
to the wife to bind her'husband, so that the decision in Jolly v.
Bees, 15 C. B. N. S. 628, has no applicdtion. Contracts entered
into with an insane person may be enforced against him where no
advantage is taken of his incapacity, and where the consideration
is wholly or in part executed: 3ioulton v. Camroux, 2 Ex. 487,
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and in error, 4 Ex. 17; Baxter v. Earlof Portsmouth, 5 B. & C.
170; Brown v. Goddrell, 3 C. & P. 30 (see ruling of Lord TENTERDEN); -Danev. V7 iscounte88 Kirkwall, 8 Id. 679, and Neill v.
Morley, 9 Yes. Jun. 478 (see judgment by Sir WILLIAM GRANT at
p. 481). In Stead v. Thornton, note to Stevens v. Badcocek, 8 B.
& Ad. 857, the decision turned upon the lunatic having been incompetent to appoint any agent. So also in Tarbuck v. Biepham, 2
M. & W. 2, PARKE, B., at p. 8, says that a lunatic cannot appoint
an agent to state an account. In Reed v. Legard, 6 Ex. 636, the
husband was held liable for goods supplied to his wife during his
lunacy, but the goods were necessaries, so that case is not in point.
See authorities referred in Story on Agency, sect. 481, also the
cases collected in the note to Manby v. Scott, 2 Smith Lead. Cas.,
7th ed. 469, et seq.
Borne _Payne, for the defendant.-It is submitted that lunacy
operates as an absolute revocation of the agent's authority. A
lunatic's marriage is void, if, when the ceremony took place, he
was so insane as not to understand the nature of the act he was
performing: Browning v. Beane, 2 Phill. Ecc. Cas. 69; see also
Howard v. Digby, 2 C1. & Fin. 634. The cases of Stead v.
Thornton, reported in note to Stephens v. Badeock, 8 B. & Ad.
357, and Tarbuck v. Bispham, 2 M. & W. 2, are distinct
authorities to show that a lunatic is incapable of appointing an
agent. So, also, in Story on Agency, 7th ed. see. 6, in dealing
with the question as to who may delegate authority to agents, it is
said, "Idiots, lunatics and persons not suijurisare-wholly incapable." With the exception of the above, there are no authorities on
the matter. The inconvenience would be extreme if the agent's
employment might continue after the lunacy of his principal.
BRETT, L. J.-This appeal has stood over for a very long time,
and principally on my account. It has stood over in order to enable me to make every effort to decide the question involved upon
some satisfactory principle. But, speaking only for myself, I have
found the doctrine applicable, the most difficult and least to be
satisfactorily explained doctrine I have ever met with in the English
law. The facts are that the defendant when sane, gave to his wife
an absolute authority to act for him, and held out to the plaintiff
that he had given his wife that authority. I think it must be taken
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as a fact, also, that afterwards the defendant became not merely
insane, but so insane that he could not have'contracted with any one
on his own behalf, and so insane that if he had attempted to make
a contract with any one, it would have been seen at once by the
other person, that he was too insane to do so. Under these circumstances, the wife ordered the goods from the plaintiff, who had no
knowledge of the lunacy, and was supplied with them by him. The
husband was confined for a time in a lunatic asylum, but afterwards
recovered his reason. After hij recovery the present action is
brought against him, and he defends it on the ground that the maT.date or authority which he gave to his wife, was put an end to by
his subsequent insanity, and therefore, that he is not liable for the
price of the goods, and the plaintiff cannot recover it from him.
MELLOR, J., left no question to the jury as to the extent or amount
of the defendant's insanity, but directed them that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover. It must be taken, therefore, I think, that
insanity existed to the extent I have stated. Two questions arise
on these facts: First, does the insanity of the principal put an end
to the mandate or authority given to the agent? i. e., does it cause
that mandate or authority to cease ? One would have thought
that question would have been found to have been decided on clear
principles. But when authorities are looked into--and I have
looked into Story on Agency, the Scottish and French authorities,
Pothier and others-no satisfactory conclusion can be arrived at.
If it is held that such insanity as existed here, did not put an end
to the agent's authority, then clearly the plaintiff is entitled to
recover upon that ground.
But, in my opinion, such insanity does put an end to the agent's
authority. It is admitted that there are certain changes of 8tatus
which do put an end to it. For instance, if a woman be the principal who appoints an agent, and she marries, her marriage puts an
end to the authority previously given to that agent. The bankruptcy of a principal puts an end to it. His death puts an end to
it. The reason why the authority is then put an end to, is stated
to be because the person who otherwise would be liable has become
a different person from the giver of the authority. In marriage,
the husband; in bankruptcy, the assignee; in death, the heir or
executor, would be substituted for the person who gave the authority. If the change of the person who gave the authority were the
real ground upon which we had to proceed, then the lunacy of the
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principal would not put an end to the authority until that lunacy
was established by a commission having been held, so that the committee would be liable instead of the lunatic. But I do not think
that is a satisfactory principle upon which to base the rule. In
bankruptcy, the assignee, although he is a different person, is
bound to carry out some contracts made by the bankrupt. In the
case of death, the executors are the representatives of the dead
person for many purposes. I, therefore, think the true ground is
that the agent, being a person appointed when the principal could
act for himself to act for him, when the principal, according to law,
cannot act for himself, the person who represents him ceases to be
able to act for him. If that is so, where there is lunacy like that
in the present case-lunacy so great that the person who suffers
from it has no contracting mind, and cannot contract or do any
legal act for himself for want of mind-then, as the principal at
law is incapable of doing the act for himself, his agent cannot do it
for him. Such lunacy, therefore, puts an end to the authority of
the agent, and if any agent acts for his principal after such lunacy
is brought to his knowledge, that agent would be doing a wrongful
act both to the principal and the person with whom he dealt, and
he would be liable to any person with whom he so acted for the
principal.
If, therefore, this lady, the defendant's wife, who must be taken
to have known of her husband's lunacy, had acted with anybody to
whom her previous authority had not been held out, I should say
she would be acting as her husband's agent wrongfully, although,
being a married woman, it would be difficult to make her liable. I
should say the contract would be void as against the supposed principal, and the agent in such a case would himself be liable for misleading an innocent person. But then comes the question, who is
liable where the authority of the agent has been held out to a person dealt with who had no notice of the principal's lunacy? An
agent may be held out as having authority in one of two ways.
Where some instrument, such as a power of attorney, asserts that
he has the authority, then the fact of the power of attorney having
been previously given, is an assertion that the person holding it
may act for the principal, and if the agent is acted with within that
authority the principal is bound. The other way in which an agent
may be held out as having authority, is where something has been
done, as in the present case, where the principal, whilst sane, has
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held out that his agent had authority to act for him in particular
cases, and then the principal having become insane, and the agent
xnowing of the lunacy, nevertheless acts with a third person as
though the authority continued. What is the consequence? It
seems to me that a person who deals with the agent without knowledge of the principal's lunacy, has a right so to deal, and that the
lunatic is bound by having held out the authority of the agent. It
is difficult to state what are the grounds upon which this principle
rests. It is sometimes said that the right depends on contract. I
cann-: see it. It is also put on the ground of estoppel. It is
somewhat difficult to see how, in strictness, there can be an estoppel.
It is also said that the right depends upon representations made by
the principal, upon which a person with no notice to the contrary
is entitled to act. There is an elaborate note in Story on Agency,
by the editors of the seventh edition, in which they say the principle is to be defended on the ground of public policy. It is said
by others to be in aid of rendering effectual business transactions.
To my mind, the better way of stating the ground is, that it is
because of a representation, made by the principal when he was sane
and could make it, to an innocent party, upon which the latter has
a right to act until he knows of the lunacy. Supposing there is no
lunacy, but a principal holds out a person to be his agent, and then,
of his own accord, withdraws the agency. As between the principal and the agent, the right to bind the principal has ceased, and
then the agent does a wrongful act by acting with a third person as
though the authority continued; nevertheless, if the agent has been
held out as having authority to the third person, and the latter acts
with the agent before he has received any notice of the authority
having ceased, the principal is still bound, upon the ground that he
made representations upon which the third person had a right to act,
and cannot retract from the consequences of those representations.
It is true, that if the principal becomes lunatic, he cannot himself
give notice to the third person of the agency having ceased, and he
may be an innocent suffenxr from the wrongful act of the age-at.
lBat so is the other, and it is a principle of law, that where it is a
question which of two innocent parties shall suffer, that one must
suffer who caused the state of things upon which the other has
acted. Therefore, in my opinion, although the lunatic recovers his
reason, he cannot, after his recovery, any more than if he had never
been a lunatic, say that an innocent person who acted on represent-
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ations made before lunacy, had not a right to do so. A difficulty.
no doubt, arises in stating a general principle applicable to such
cases as these; but, for my own part, although it is not necessary
to decide the question to-day, I should think that the same rule
would apply in the case of the principal's death as of his lunacy;
and that if representations made by a person during life, were acted
upon after his death by an innocent party, without any knowledge
of the death, the principal's executors would be bound.
On these grounds, therefore, although the authority was put an
end to by the defendant's lunacy, and the agent had no authority
to deal with the plaindtiff, I nevertheless think that the plaintiff can
recover, because representations were made by the defendant whilst
sane to the plaintiff, upon which the plaintiff was entitled to act
until he had notice of the lunacy, and no such notice was given to
him.
L. J.-I am of the same opinion. I desire to add
a few words to what has been said by BRETT, L. J., in whose judgment I entirely agree. The defendant in this case must be taken
to have told the plaintiff, or represented to him that the defendant's
wife was his agent to contract debts with the plaintiff in the way of
his trade, and that the plaintiff might continue to deal with her on
the responsibility of the defendant. That is the effect of what has
been found in this case. It is quite clear when such an authority
as this is given, that it continues until it is revoked, and notice of
the revocation is given to the person who has been told that he may
deal with the agent. That is the general rule, but then it is said,
that it does not apply where the revocation is not intentional, but
arises by reason of the principal's insanity. Why ? It may be a
hardship on the person who gives the authority, but it is much
harder on the person who acts on that authority without notice of
the revocation. Insanity is not a privilege, so as to give the person who suffers from it a benefit at the expense of the other; it is
a disability wbich no doubt ought not to be allowed to affect the
insane person more than is necessary. I therefore think that there
is no reason why a case like this should be taken out of the general
rie-, to which I have referred, and indeed it would be most alarming
if it were. The person who had been told that he was the agent,
might continue so to act most innocently-with the utmost bona
fides; he might not know of the lunacy, or, if he did know, might
BRAMWELL,
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think the best thing for the lunatic was to continue the agency;
yet, in all these cases, if the argument for the plaintiff was rightly
founded, he would be liable to pay over again for the goods to the
principal, or to make good any mischief which had happened to the
person with whom the agent had acted. With respect to what the
reason of the rule is, I do not like to lay it down with much peremptoriness. It seems to me like the case of a guarantee where a
person says, "Supply goods to A. B., and I will pay for them until
I revoke the authority." It seems to me that the thing is in the
nature either of an agreement between the parties, or of a license
to the person supplying the goods. The agreement or license continue in force until revocation. Lord Justice BRETT'S judgfuent,
has proceeded on the ground that the defendant was in such a state
of insanity, that the insanity itself was a revocation. Now, I am
not prepared to say every case of insanity would be sufficient to
revoke the authority. I should think the insanity must be something approaching dementia, in order to do so. If the defendant,
for instance, had known that his wife was pledging his credit, I do
not think that because he was insane he would have ceased to be
liable. Where a man has no mind at all, of course he is incapable
of contracting; he is like a dead man, he has no contracting intelligence. If that was the case here, I think the judgment of the
court below may be well supported on the ground relied on by
BRETT, L. J., and should be affirmed.
BRETT, L.

J.-COTToN, L.

J., agrees with the conclusion to

which we have come. He does not wish to pledge himself to any
opinion as to whether or not the authority was in fact put an end
to in this case, or whether or not it can be put an end to in like cases
until there has been a commission of lunacy. As to the holding out
of authority he thinks that there is a contract between the person
making the representation of authority and the person to whom it
is made; that that contract exists until notice of revocation, and
that the principal is bound by the acts of the agent until such notice
has been given. He wishes his judgment to be put on the ground
that in this case the former contract had not been put an end to,
and that the defendant is therefore bound. I wish for myself to
add, that if there was any question as to the extent of the defendant's insanity, it should have been left to the jury. In argument,
however, it was admitted that in fact, the defendant was in such a
VoL. XXVIfI.-14

106

DREW v. NUNN.

state of lunacy that he could not contract himself. Mere weaknems
of mind would not bring the case within the rule I have laid down.
Order discharged.
Among the various causes or modes of
evocation of an agent's authority, the.
prevailing rule is that it shall not affect
third persons until notice, or at least
knowledge of the facts which work a
revocation is received by the person to
be affected thereby.
This is undoubtedly true as to voluntary revocation by the principal, especially where he was negligent in not
giving notice thereof: Morgan v. Steel,
5 Binn. 305 (1812) ; Beard v. Kirk, 11
N. H. 397 (1840) ; Tierv. Linpson, 35
Vt. 179 (1862); Diversy v. Kellogg, 44
I1. 114 (1867); Jones v. Hodgkins, 61
Ale. 480 (1872); Fellows v. Hartford
and N. Y. &eamboat Co., 38 Conn. 197
(1871)..
And the American cases applying the
same principle to revocation by the insan
ity of the principal: Davis v. Lane, 10
N. H. 156 (1839), much like the case
of Drew v. Nunn; Wallis v. Manhattan
Bank, 2 Hall 495 (1829).
It is not impossible that a judicial declaration of lunacy, and an appointment
of a guardian, or committee, to take
charge of the lunatic's estate might, ipso
facto, 'work a revocation, since all the
estate to be affected would then be out
of the principal's hands and control ; but
this, if so, rests upon somewhat different
grounds.
See Walis v. Manhattan
Bank, supra; lier v. Baker, 6 Humph.
85.
For similar reasons a judicial decree
of bankruptcy against the principal, may
at once work a revocation of any prior
agent's power to dispose of his estate,
even as against subsequent bonafide purchasers ; for the bankrupt, after-such decree, has no estate to dispose of: Minett
v. Forrester, 4 Taunt. 541 (1811);
Parker v. Smith, 16 East 382 (1812).
But see Ogden v. Gillingham, Baldw.
39 (1829).

The most prominent instance of instan.
taneous revocation, even without notice.
is that of the death of the principal.
This, it is now well settled, terminates
the agent's authority, and third persons
dealing with him afterwards, though in
entire ignorance of the principal's death,
acquire no rights against his estate (excepting, of course, cases where a power
is coupled with an interest). The short
argument is, there is no principal, and
if no principal there can be no agent, and
so no contract. Another view taken is
that the death, being a public act, is implied notice to all the world, and so every
one is bound to have knowledge of it;
but this seems somewhat like a legal fiction. The result, however, is well settled. See Marlet v. .Tackman, 3 Allen
287 (1861), a case of partnership, to be
sure; but the same principles are supposed to gover both cases: Harper v.
Ltle, 2 Greenl. 14 (1822) ; Lewis v.
Kerr, 17 Iowa 73 (1864); Turnan v.
Temple, 84 Ill. 286 (1876); Gleason v.
Dodd, 4 Mlet. 333 (1842); Michigan
Insurance Co. v. Leavenworth, 30 Vt.
12 (1856); Gale v. Tappan, 12 N. H.
145 (1841); Rigs v. Cage, 2 Humph.
350 (1840); Matson v. King, I Stark.
121(1815) ; Wallacev. Cook, 5 Esp. 118
(1804) ; Scruggs v. Drivers, 31 Ala.
274 (1857); ,Saltmarsh v. Smith, 32 Id.
404 (1858); Cleveland v. Williams, 29
Tex. 205 (1867) ; Ferris v. Irving, 28
Cal. 645 (1865).
On the other hand, many respectable
authorities hold that death, without notice, does not instantly work a revocation,
if the act to be done, or contract to be
made, can be and is done, in the name
of the agent, and not in the name of the
principal. That a deed of real estate,
requiring the principal's name, cannot
be executed by an agent, after his pnncipal's death, all agree ; but as to many

